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Abstract
In today's competitive business environment, strategies relating to market forecasting,
decision making and risk management have received a lot of attention. The empirical result-
s reveal that the market movement is not neutral to large orders. This makes the investors
suer from prohibitive execution costs. Hence, eective optimal execution strategies that
assist investors on controlling market reaction are desperately demanded. However, most
existing methods for analysing these strategies suer from a serious weakness in that they
fail to consider the impact of large orders on market price. In this thesis, the analysis of op-
timal execution strategies is conducted from the perspective of agent-based computational
nance.
This thesis introduces an articial stock market composed of agents assigned with in-
formation sharing and trading strategies, and analyses the market impact and reaction
when agents are assigned with optimal trading strategies, including minimum risk volume-
weighted average price (VWAP) and implementation shortfall (IS) strategies. In addition,
renement has also been made to the IS strategy by replacing the linear temporary impact
function with a quadratic one.
Key Words: Articial Stock Market, Market Impact, Optimal Execution Strategy,
VWAP, Implementation Shortfall, Quadratic Temporary Impact Function
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The study of algorithmic trading always starts with studying the optimal execution strate-
gies. Instead of seeking speculative opportunities, optimal execution strategies focus on
executing orders with minimized cost. From the perspective of individual investors, their
orders would not signicantly aect the market price, due to the relatively small volume
of either buying or selling positions. But orders from institutional investors are generally
considered as the driving force of market price, and generally lead to a gap (or in other
words, execution cost) between the market price and the real captured price.
The size of execution cost directly determines the protability of an institutional in-
vestor. One example is the famous Value-Line Funds (as in [1]). From 1965 to 1986, the
average annually book return of Value-Line Funds was over 20%, but the real captured
return turned out to be only 2:5% above the market growth. This tremendous gap arose
directly from the execution cost.
Before the widespread of algorithmic trading strategies, institutional investors who
wanted to liquidize their orders had to hire broker-dealers to nd a counter-party to pre-
vent the market impact from executing their orders. When a qualied counter-party was
not available, some special strategies were conducted by broker-dealers to gradually liq-
uidize their large positions in the market, so that the market impact would be diminished
at a low level. Therefore, these strategies built the foundation of optimal execution strate-
gies. Nowadays, the advance in algorithmic trading have enabled institutional traders to
manage their execution costs. This has sparked the academic interest in optimal execution
strategies.
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Recently, extensive studies have been conducted on acquiring an optimal execution
strategy for institutional investors. As for measuring the risk and further quantitative
analysis, most studies start with modelling the market price movement [2, 3, 4]. Often, they
share a common assumption that the market price movement follows Geometric Brownian
Motion, ignoring the fact that an order may impact the market. This assumption is widely
accepted in most of the pricing models or trading strategies. However, the Geometric
Brownian Motion assumption is too restrictive when the model admits the market impact
from large orders. In this case, the market price would follow a dierent type of distribution.
To solve this, Almgren and Chriss postulated that the price impact is also a part of the
driving force of the random walk process[3].
1.2 Research Methodology
In this thesis, we will explore the use of a new methodology in addressing the aforemen-
tioned problems. They require a new model to incorporate the impact caused by a large
order placement into the price formation process from both the supply and demand per-
spectives. This leads us to the area of agent-based computational nance.
The past few decades have witnessed a rapid development of agent-based computational
nance. At the same time, criticism has also been levied against this eld, since it has so
far been unable to mimic the real nancial behaviours in the market. Despite this, the
agent-based computational nance method oers a way to simulate all possible scenarios.
By assigning dierent parameters, an agent-based computational system models a typical
pattern of pricing process replicating the price formation mechanism in the real world.
1.3 Research Objectives
In the following paragraphs, we will highlight our contributions to the study of the Imple-
mentation Shortfall (IS) strategy by using the agent-based simulation method. In addition,
we will analyse its market-wide impact on the articial stock market system and focus on
the following objectives:
 Research Objective 1: Construct the Minimum Risk Volume Weighted Average Price
(VWAP) model and the Implementation Shortfall models based on linear and non-
linear temporary impact assumptions
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We will present the optimal volume weighted average price (minimum risk VWAP)
model proposed by Hizuru Konishi[2] and implementation shortfall (IS) model intro-
duced by Almgren and Chirss[3]. Moreover, we will also make an improvement to
the IS model by replacing the linear temporary impact assumption with a quadratic
one. Calculations and comparisons will also be made based on these three models.
 Research Objective 2: Construct an Articial Stock Market
In order to carry out our analyses of optimal execution strategies, we will construct
an articial stock market. Order formation, market clearing and information propa-
gation mechanisms will be designed for that market.
 Research Objective 3: Analyse market eects of linear and non-linear temporary
impact IS model
We will study the market quality indicators and agents' performances under various
market circumstances, such as markets with diering levels of information availability
or proportions of investors.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we selectively re-
view the literature and background knowledge on agent-based computational models and
optimal execution strategies. In chapter 3, we will introduce the mathematical model of
minimum risk VWAP and implementation shortfall algorithms. We will also present an
improved implementation shortfall model. In chapter 4, we will discuss our agent-based
model, and present the information sharing and market price formation mechanisms. Em-
pirical analysis will be performed on the impact of dierent algorithms with dierent pa-
rameter settings in chapter 5. We will also full the third research objective we proposed
above. Finally, we will discuss the empirical ndings, limitations, and implications for fur-
ther study in chapter 6. Detailed descriptions about the genetic algorithm for numerical
optimizations are given in the appendix.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Background and
Literature Review
2.1 Algorithmic Trading and Optimal Execution S-
trategies
2.1.1 Overview
Algorithmic trading, also known as automated trading, was introduced a few decades ago.
Although it is relatively new, its promising protability and automatic nature have already
made it popular in the capital market. According to a NYSE report in 2000, 22% of trad-
ing activities were conducted via trading algorithms, comparing to 11.6% in 1995. This
number went up to 50.6% in 2004. Being free from the interference of emotional behaviour
and inconsistent decisions made by human beings, algorithmic trading is able to accurate-
ly execute the pre-determined trading strategies without any hesitation and exploit the
arbitrage opportunities with a reaction time of mini-seconds. Traders may be tempted to
deviate from their trading strategies once those strategies appear to be malfunctioning with
non-preferable returns. Such deviations may cause cancellation of the otherwise successful
trading strategies or result in a large risk exposure to the portfolios. Trading algorithms
take market data such as price and volume as their inputs and give orders to buy or sell
as outputs. On the other hand, trading strategies are formulated mathematically and pro-
grammed by utilizing algorithmic trading methods, thus algorithmic trading is immune to
any bias or deviation caused by human nature.
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Algorithms can be categorized into two branches based on the particular objectives:
optimal execution algorithms and speculative algorithms. The aim of the optimal execu-
tion algorithms is to minimize the market impact and opportunity cost of order execution,
while speculative algorithms are designed to hedge market risk and seek potential prots.
Although speculative strategies are of great importance in both academic and industrial
society, we will mainly focus on optimal execution strategies. Developers of optimal exe-
cution strategies often have to compromise between opportunity cost and market impact
risk. Traditionally, by bridging the development environment with trading infrastructure,
the algorithm will be applicable for being tested with real-time data from the nancial
market. The trading system extracts market data, such as price, volume and volatility,
into the database. The algorithm processes the input data in order to generate an optimal
trading strategy. The system will record the performance, risk exposure and trading cost,
and, in return, rene the trading algorithm. The optimal algorithm is reached after the
iterative renement has taken place by training it in a cyclic way.
Optimal execution strategies take into account a variety of current market conditions
as well as characteristics of the order to be processed: order type, size, and frequency [5].
Bertsimas and Lo(1998) developed the strategies to take advantage of instantaneous price
change when executing an order [6]. Kissell and Malamut(2006) investigated the adaptation
process of the speed of order processing according to traders' current beliefs about the
impending direction of market prices [7]. Capital markets algorithmic trading costs are an
important factor that aects an optimal execution strategy. Generally, algorithmic trading
costs mainly consider two factors: proportional transaction costs and liquidity cost. Pham
et al [8] studied the permanent market impact and xed discrete transaction costs based
on an assumption that the price process follows Brownian motion. Junca [9] analysed
the case where no transaction cost is involved and how this formulation relates with a
singular control problem and provided a viscosity solution characterization. Almgren and
Chriss (2001) studied the execution of portfolio transactions with the aim of minimizing a
combination of opportunity cost and transaction cost, and introduced the implementation
shortfall strategy, which sparked a great deal of interest from both researchers and investors
[3]. Apart from optimizing the execution cost, algorithms that optimize liquidity supply,
hedge positions and even monitor position changes in the marketplace, have also been
developed [5]. In the following sections, we will introduce two common forms of optimal
execution algorithms: the minimal cost algorithm and the volume participation algorithm.
Seminal works like [10, 11] were the rst to suggest that informed investors should trade
in a strategy that precludes other participants from recognizing their orders, in case of being
front-run by others. Chakravarty(2001) investigated the impact of stealth trading upon the
market price and found that medium-sized orders may always result in a disproportionally
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large market impact [12]. By slicing a large or medium-sized order into smaller ones and
executing them subsequently, an investor is able to control his trading aggressiveness and
market impact.
2.1.2 Minimal Cost Algorithms
Aggressive execution strategies with large orders can lead to disastrous eects on both
market price and volume, although the traders may benet from locking their prot in
advance if the market goes in tandem with their expectations. On the other hand, traders
using relatively passive executing strategies and aiming to minimize the market impact may
suer a large opportunity risk.To balance between an aggressive and passive execution,
Almgren and Chriss [3] structured the problem as:
min

Cost() + Risk() (2.1)
In this optimization problem, they minimize the linear combination of trading cost
and opportunity cost.  is the trading rate, which can be used as a measurement of
market aggressiveness, while  represents the coecient of risk aversion of investors. It
was suggested by [13] that market aggressiveness varies with respect to the usage of market
or limit orders. Contrary to a limit order, a market order is more likely to be executed in
a relatively short time, raising the market aggressiveness considerably.
The cost and risk functions in (2.1) are dened as:
Cost() = E0[S()  Sb]; (2.2)
Risk() = ("()); (2.3)
S() = S + h(X;) + g(X) + "(); (2.4)
where E0 denotes the ex-ante expectation at the beginning of the trading period, Sb the
benchmark execution price, S() the realized execution price and "() a random deviation
of the trading outcome with E["()] = 0 and V ar["()] = 2(). S is the market price
when the order is placed and X is the order size. h(X;) is the temporary market impact
function due to the liquidity demand of trading, while g(X) is the permanent price impact
function due to the change in market condence or information leakage during the order
execution.
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The minimal cost approach proposed by Almgren and Chriss is known as the Imple-
mentation Shortfall (IS) strategy. The idea of IS was rst introduced by Perold[14]. It is a
standard ex-post measure of transaction costs used in performance valuations, dened as
the dierence XS0   nk ~Sk between the initial book price and the captured price. Alm-
gren and Chriss modelled the temporary and permanent impact function of the market
and, from that, they derived a price sequence. The objective of their strategy can be
presented as:
min
x:V (x)6V?
E(x); (2.5)
where E(x) is the expectation of IS while V (x) is the variance. We will introduce their
work in the coming chapter, along with a slight improvement to their impact functions.
2.1.3 Volume Participation Algorithms
Another execution approach, which is relatively passive compared to the minimal cost
algorithms, is to issue a certain portion of orders according to the expected volume on the
trading day.
A widely accepted implementation of volume participation algorithms is the volume-
weighted average price (VWAP) algorithm. VWAP is one of the most popular measures of
trading cost. It is based on a simple straightforward idea of the weighted moving average
of the trading horizon. In the real world, a broker may guarantee an execution of an order
with the VWAP algorithm and have a computer program to place orders for exploiting
the trader's commission and create P&L. This is called a guaranteed VWAP execution.
VWAP balances execution with volume, and it is calculated according to the following
formulas:
PVWAP =
P
j Pj QJP
j Qj
; (2.6)
where PVWAP is a volume weighted average price, Pj the price of each individual trade and
Qj the quantity of each individual trade.
Konishi [2] introduced a static optimal execution strategy for a VWAP trade. Specical-
ly, it is an order slicing strategy based on traders' forecasts of the distribution of volatility
and market trading volume during a trading day. The objective of this strategy can be
formulated as:
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min
x(t)
E[(VWAP   vwap)2]; (2.7)
where VWAP stands for the market VWAP while vwap is the VWAP of a trader's execu-
tion strategy. x(t) denotes the trader's remaining position at time t. We know that, since
vwap is a function of trader's trading volume during the whole trading period, it also can
be seen as a function of the trader's remaining position x(t). (2.7) expresses the main idea
of a VWAP execution strategy: the trader will try his best to get his vwap as close to the
market VWAP as possible, thereby executing the minimum risk VWAP trading strategy.
In that paper, the authors modelled the price process as a Brownian motion without a
drift term. McCulloch and Kazakov(2007) proved that a semi-martingale price process
Pt = At +Mt + P0 in which At is the drift, will also be applicable since the price drift
does not contribute to VWAP risk [15]. Moreover, McCulloch and Kazakov generalized
Konishi's minimum VWAP risk trading problem [2] to an optimal VWAP trading problem,
by using a mean-variance framework with a user-dened coecient of risk aversion . This
can be expressed as a mean-variance optimization:
max
x(t)
[E((x(t)))  V ar((x(t)))]; (2.8)
where (x(t)) denotes the dierence between traded VWAP and market VWAP as a func-
tion of the trading strategy x(t) and  is the coecient of risk aversion. We will introduce
these strategies in the coming chapters.
2.2 General Framework of ACE and Its Applications
2.2.1 Study of Market Micro-structure
A market is a complex environment where exchanges between two parties take place a-
long with the activities of bargaining and negotiating. It allows prices and quantities to
be adjustable based on demands and supplies. It also makes the existence of perfectly
competitive economies possible. In 1874, Leon Walras [16] published Elements of Pure E-
conomics with an explanation of the General Equilibrium theory. In a General Equilibrium
framework, the allocation of products and service is determined by price signals, and at the
same time, market supplies and demands will automatically be equalized. As pointed out
in [17, 18], there are three assumptions required to apply the General Equilibrium theory
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to a modern economy: (1) all agents face the same prices; (2) all agents are price takers,
namely they take prices as given and do not consider that their purchasing decisions will
move prices; (3) markets exist for all goods, and agents can freely participate in these
markets. If we add another weak assumption that the desire of consumers can never be
fully satised, we will get the rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics, which states
that any Walrasian (or competitive) equilibrium leads to a Pareto ecient allocation of
resources [19].
The weakest point of General Equilibrium theory rests on these three aforementioned
assumptions. The existence of the Walrasian Auctioneer may prevent any form of strategic
behaviour. It assumes that information only exists in price, and communication between
participants is not allowed. Since the only exogenous factors utilized by consumers to make
their decisions are price and dividend, the decision-making process reduces to a relatively
simple optimization problem. By assuming the existence of a Walrasian Auctioneer, a
system can reach its equilibrium.
Although General Equilibrium theory already claried the assumptions required for an
optimal allocation of resources, it is unable to explain why manufacturing, pricing and
trading activities interact with each other only through procurement processes. As stated
in [20], the procurement process consists of various factors, since consumers need to decide
the purchase quantity while manufacturers need to determine the price and quantity that
are most likely to be welcome in the market. Moreover, allies may be formed among
consumers or among manufacturers in order to maximize their own prots.
A theoretical framework serves as a simplication of our real world, and the General
Equilibrium theory serves to simplify a procurement process. Especially in an economic
system with an attainable long-term equilibrium, such a simplication is necessary and ap-
plicable since the procurement process will not aect the system in the long run. However,
if no attainable long-term equilibrium can be reached, the General Equilibrium theory
may turn out to be insucient in describing the behaviour of participants. In fact, the
procurement process is a deterministic force that manipulates the whole system.
It is only relatively recent that researchers have started exploring alternative models
without the Walrasian Auctioneer assumption in order to study market behaviour and mar-
ket micro-structure. Studies start with the pricing models based on participants' activities
and their reactions to their competitors. Some further studies also reveal diculties arising
from the complexity of the dynamics in the market. This includes information asymmetry,
strategic interaction, and so on. In order to model these factors and construct a more
general model, an agent-based computational method (ACM) is introduced by researchers.
The agent-based computational method requires a complex adaptive system which consists
9
of a great number of interacting agents.
2.2.2 The Evolution of ACM
In the past few decades, fuelled by the expansion of computational capacity, the agent-based
computational method has been applied to research elds such as economics, managemen-
t science, game theory and nance. The rst attempt of the agent based computational
method was made in [21], in which Axelrod extensively used a set of computational simula-
tions to study the strategic behaviour of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. By introducing
this new computational idea, that paper is viewed as providing the foundation of a new
branch in game theory.
In the 1980s, a new eld called Articial Life (AL) was introduced by treating life as a
computational model. This name was coined in 1986 by Christopher Langton, an American
computer scientist. Meanwhile, Santa-Fe Institute also pioneered research in integrating
computational approaches with the social sciences. One of these studies implemented the
agent-based computational method in nance, based on bounded rationality and inductive
reasoning theories. In this framework, an articial stock market is constructed as a multi-
agent system using a large-scale computational process as well as articial intelligence
theories. It is shown to be an ecient method for testing theoretical models when an
analytical solution is not an option. Just as Cristiano Castelfranchi said in [22]:" Agent-
based Social Simulation will be crucial for the solution of one of the hardest problems of
economic theory: the spontaneous organization of dynamic social orders that cannot be
planned but emerge out of intentional planning agents."
Lovric et al [23] studied the evolution of a decentralized market under controlled experi-
mental conditions. By setting an initial population of agents, such as traders and nancial
institutions, the system is constructed with determined initial position and information
for each agent. Without any interference from its modeller, the system evolves over time,
driven by the eects of its endogenous factors, the interactions between agents for instance.
Agents in stock markets are usually modelled mathematically by specifying heterogene-
ity, bounded rationality and interaction through a certain trading mechanisms. Sometimes,
possible learning and evolving mechanism may also be incorporated into the model, as well
as trading and portfolio strategies.
The Gode & Sunder model was created in 1993 [24]. It assumes traders have zero-
intelligence without learning and no logical decision-making mechanisms. As a result,
they randomly trade in a double auction house. Although the Gode & Sunder model is
very simple, it did lay the foundation for modelling an articial stock market and allow
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further incorporation of learning and evolving mechanisms into the model. Following such
a conceptual framework, in 1994, Routledge [25] developed a new model to study the
uncertainty and information in a nancial market. Later, the Arifovic model [26] was
introduced to model the foreign exchange market based on the General Equilibrium theory
known as the multiple-point general equilibrium theory. In 1996, the articial neural
network was introduced into economics and nancial modelling [27] as a price forecasting
algorithm.
The Santa-Fe framework [28] was introduced in 1997. It was designed to analyse the
stock pricing process and price volatility. Agents in this model are assumed to be bounded
rationale, making decisions based on their anticipation of future prices and dividends. The
resulting forecasts will determine their demand functions, featuring dierent parameters for
their learning and adapting processes. After that, Microscopic Simulation was introduced
from physical science into the nancial markets, serving as a tool for studying complex
systems by simulating many interacting microscopic elements [29]. It is believed that mi-
croscopic simulation models could be used to extend existing analytical models in nance,
by either replacing more realistic assumptions or building new ones, such as models that
incorporate various technical and fundamental strategies observed in experiments and real
markets and dynamic models with heterogeneous investors that can learn and change their
strategies [23].
In recent years, along with the fast development of computer technology, even more
models have been introduced in dierent supporting platforms. Table 2.1 contains a list of
some existing platforms that can be used for stock market analysis, such as the very rst
agent-based computational platform called Swarm.
2.2.3 General Framework of Agent-based Computational Method
2.2.3.1 Economic System
Under the framework of ACM, an economic system is a complex adaptive system [30]. A
complex adaptive system is one special case of a complex system, and a complex system
that can be dened as (1) a system consisting of multiple interactive units, and (2) a system
that exhibits emergent properties. That is to say, a system that can acquire properties
from the interactions of its units and not from the units themselves.
As argued in [31, 32], there is still no universal denition for the complex adaptive
system. Here are three representative denitions that are widely accepted:
11
Table 2.1: Agent-based computational platforms
Language Java C++ C Logo Dialects Visual Languages
ADK DeX Echo NetLogo MAML
AnyLogic LSD MAML MacStarLogo PS-I
Ascape MOOSE StarLogo RepastS
Cougaar Jade's Sim++ OpenStarLogo SeSAm
DOMAR-J SimBioSys StarLogoT SimPlusPlus
jEcho StarLogo TNG SME
ECJ Zeus
FAMOJA StarLogo TNG
Jade AgentSheets
Platform JAS
JASA
JCA-Sim
jES
JESS
Mason
Moduleco
Omonia
Swarm
VSEit
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 Denition 1: A complex adaptive system is a complex system that consists of
multiple units with reactive ability, which means that its units may change their
characteristics according to exogenous factors.
 Denition 2: A complex adaptive system is a complex system that consists of
multiple goal-directed units, which means that its units may react to exogenous
factors in order to achieve their goals.
 Denition 3: A complex adaptive system is a complex system that consists of
multiple planner units, which means its units may interact or even control exogenous
factors in order to achieve their goals.
2.2.3.2 Agent
In an articial stock market, agents are abstractions of traders, brokers, nancial institu-
tions and retail investors. Agents are sealed software systems with algorithms to process
data. Some of their data is private while other data is public or partially public. With the
public-available data, agents communicate and interact based on the information at hand.
An articial stock market is initialized by setting the initial dataset for agents and
specifying decision-making algorithms as well as data publicity. The data contains various
aspects of an agent's attributions, such as type (institutions, individuals, etc.) and struc-
tural attributions (such as social network and utility function). Behaviours of agents are
categorized into social behaviour and strategic behaviour. Social behaviour is determined
by forming relations with other agents while strategic behaviour is the outcome of private
decision-making algorithms, such as pricing, learning and portfolio strategies.
2.2.3.3 Learning
Learning is a process in which individuals or agents collect and process information after
they make their decisions. In the articial stock market simulations, agents start with a
pre-specied set of information and parameters, which shape their behavioural pattern.
The greedy agents without equipping themselves with a learning mechanism would suer
from continuous loss when the parameters are ill-posed, while the agents with a learning
mechanism would learn to adapt their strategies according to the current market status.
Currently, the subject of learning algorithms has become a hot topic, and the most fre-
quently used algorithms are the articial neural network, learning classier systems and
the genetic algorithm.
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2.2.3.4 Objective and Application
The articial stock market provides a new approach to mimic market phenomena under
various market scenarios, and also brings insights into understanding investors' decision-
making mechanism.
Furthermore, apart from the out-sample empirical tests, the articial stock market
introduces another method for investors to explore and test new trading and executing
strategies. In the traditional empirical analysis, the price sequences are taken as the
realized market price without any impact from large orders. When the order size is large
enough to impact the market, it may turn out to be useless or sometimes even misleading
since the market impact from large orders is no longer negligible. Hence, only an approach
based on market simulation could facilitate the investors to incorporate both the price
sequence and the market reactions.
2.3 Genetic Algorithm and Numerical Optimization
2.3.1 A Brief Introduction to Genetic Algorithm
In 1950s, a few computer scientists started doing their research on 'Articial Evolutionary
System' independently, expecting that evolution could be used as a new approach for
optimizing engineering problems. They built the early prototype of genetic algorithm. In
early 1960s, Rechenberg and Schwefel implemented the idea of mutating into a wind tunnel
experiment. After that, their further researches gave birth to a branch of evolutionary
system: Evolutionary Strategy (ES), which was an early form of genetic algorithm.
Another breakthrough was made by Holland in mid 1960s. He proposed a method which
uses the bit-string encoding technology. This new method enabled the implementation of
both mutation and crossover operations. Moreover, Holland stated that it is crossover, not
mutation, that should play a main role when information is passed among generations.
An analysis using genetic algorithm starts with a population that may contain a poten-
tial optimal solution to the target functionThe rst step is map explicit information into
digit sequences. A common method is bit string encoding. After the rst generation cre-
ated, selection is performed in order to select individuals to reproduce the new generation.
Gene sequence can reproduce with crossover and mutation operations. The individual with
best tness among one generation are most likely to be one of the potential solutions to
the target function. Figure 2.1 shows the basic procedure of genetic algorithm.
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Figure 2.1: Procedure of GA
Algorithm begins with N random parents carrying their own information from a ran-
dom initiation. After calculating their tness functions, we have the tness of the rst
generation. The second step is to generate their ospring and test the optimization crite-
ria. The parents recombine their gene (crossover) in order to produce new ospring, with
a innitesimal yet positive possibility to mutate. The performance of a new generation is
evaluated by calculating tness functions. The second step is repeated until a new gener-
ation ts optimization criteria.
Three Basic Operations:
Genetic algorithm consists three basic operations: selection, crossover and mutation.
Selection:
Selection is used to select individuals for recombination or crossover, and to determine
the number of children for the given parents. The selection process gradually improves
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the overall performance of tness for each new generation. The rst step of selection is
calculating tness according to:
 proportional tness assignment;
 rank-based tness assignment.
After calculating tness for each individuals, we may select from the parent generation
using:
 roulette wheel selection;
 stochastic universal sampling;
 local selection;
 truncation selection;
 tournament selection;
Crossover / Recombination:
Genetic recombination is reproducing new-generation individuals using information
passed from the parent generation. Algorithms are classied according to various encoding
methods:
 real valued recombination;
{ discrete recombination;
{ intermediate recombination;
{ linear recombination;
{ extended linear recombination;
 binary valued crossover;
{ single-point crossover;
{ multiple-point crossover;
{ uniform crossover;
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{ shue crossover;
{ crossover with reduced surrogate;
Mutation:
New-born individuals have a small chance to mutate. This will have a disruption on
its gene sequence. Algorithms vary according to dierent encoding methods:
 real valued mutation;
 binary valued mutation.
Despite of the prosperity of choices in each step, a practical combination proposed in
[33] uses roulette wheel selection, single-point crossover and mutation.
Figure 2.2 shows the information carried by each individual from the rst generation
with their tness in bracket, where larger tness means closer approximation to the optima.
Figure 2.2: The rst generation and gene
By using the roulette wheel selection, each individual is assigned a probability propor-
tional to their tness, like a space on a roulette wheel as shown in Figure 2.3 and Table
2.2. Since there are 10 individuals in one generation, the system will sample 10 uniform
random draw in order to select parents of the next generation.
As a practical example, the ten random numbers are: 0.070221, 0.545929, 0.783567,
0.446931, 0.507893, 0.291198, 0.71634, 0.272901, 0.371435, 0.854641. The next step match-
es these random numbers with aggregate probability of each individual to see which one
is picked. In this simulation, individuals labelled as 1,8,9,6,7,5,8,4,6,10 are picked, and
individuals No.8 and No.6 are picked twice. Individuals who t the environment better
may have a higher chance to survive and be picked as parents. Individuals No.2 and No.3
are extinct because of either their low tness and a bad luck. Their positions are taken by
No.8 and No.6, which means better individual on tness has a higher chance to survive and
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Individual Chromosome Fitness Probability Aggregate Probability
1 0001100000 8 0.086957 0.086957
2 0101111001 5 0.054348 0.141304
3 0000000101 2 0.021739 0.163043
4 1001110100 10 0.108696 0.271739
5 1010101010 7 0.076087 0.347826
6 1110010110 12 0.130435 0.478261
7 1001011011 5 0.054348 0.532609
8 1100000001 19 0.206522 0.739130
9 1001110100 10 0.108696 0.847826
10 0001010011 14 0.152174 1.000000
Table 2.2: Chromosome and probability
reproduce more osprings. The crossover follows after the reproduction, which is called
hybridization in biology and is regarded as a key step of evolution. In the single-point
crossover, parents are randomly chosen from the population and exchange parts of their
chromosome. Children are born with inherited gene from the recombination of the par-
ents, as shown in Figure 2.4. In the single-point crossover, the cross-point is randomly
chosen and parents exchange parts of their gene sequences on the right hand side of the
cross-point.
However, crossover should not be the only mechanism in evolution, since children from
a relatively good ancestor will quickly dominate the whole system with high-quality gene,
and a prematurely converged solution can not stand for the global optimized solution. One
solution to this problem is to add mutation into the system. Mutation is a crucial step in
keeping the bio-diversity at an acceptable level while genes from better ancestors still have
higher chance to survive. By turning one random digit from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0, we have
the mutation mechanism implemented into our genetic system, as shown in Figure 2.5. In
fact, the probability that a mutation takes place is quite low.
In general, evolution from one generation to another includes selection, crossover and
mutation. If we put everything mentioned above together, the whole evolution procedure
can be shown by Figure 2.6. Starting from selecting parents in the rst generation based
on the tness, individuals No.8 and No.6 are picked out so that they take the place of
those with smaller tness, which are No.2 and No.3 in this case. Next, 4 pairs of parents
are chosen following certain probability distribution for the operation of the single-point
crossover, in order to produce 4 pairs of children. After that, children mutate, which
means a random digit of their chromosome have a small probability to invert. Generation
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Figure 2.3: Roulette Wheel Selection
Figure 2.4: Single-point Crossover
by generation, the system searches for increasingly closer optimal solution, and the optimal
individual among the last generation is the optimal solution. The number of generations
needed to get the optimal solution depends on the convergence property of our objective
problem.
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Figure 2.5: Mutation
Figure 2.6: Evolution procedure by genetic algorithm
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Chapter 3
Optimal Execution Strategies
3.1 Volume Participation Algorithms: Minimum Risk
VWAP
Volume-weighted average price has been used as a benchmark for measuring the trading
cost and the execution quality. When liquidizing a large order, traders and brokers are
most likely to set their objective as beating the market VWAP. An important contribution
to this eld was proposed by Konishi [2] who developed a solution to the minimum risk
VWAP trading strategy. By following Konishi [2], we introduce the minimum risk VWAP
trading strategy for single-stock cases.
The main purpose for a trader to implement VWAP strategies when executing a block of
shares X is to achieve captured prices as close to the market VWAP as possible during the
trading period. Firstly, we construct a probability space (!; F;Q) with a ltration Ft which
satises the usual conditions. Let V (t) be accumulated market trading volume excluding
the trader's at time t. Also, v(t) denotes the trader's accumulative trading volume from
time 0 to time t. Here, V (t) is an Ft-adapted process and v(t) is a controllable variable. At
the start, v(0) = V (0)=0 and the trading strategy v(t) is already given. The stock price
S(t) follows a stochastic process:
dS(t) = (t; V (t))dB(t);
where (t; V (t)) is a positive Ft-adapted process in L
2 space and B(t) is a standard Brow-
nian motion. Secondly we assume that opposite-directional operations are not allowed in
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this market, which means that no buying action is allowed when a trader is liquidizing
a sell order. By assuming this, v(t) becomes a non-decreasing function. Therefore, the
trader's own VWAP at time t can be calculated as
vwap =
R t
0
S(s)dv(s)
v(t)
Also, the market VWAP is written as
VWAP =
R t
0
S(s)d(V (s) + v(s))
V (t) + v(t)
=
R t
0
S(s)dV (s) + v(t)  vwap
V (t) + v(t)
The main objective of this is to minimize the expected squared error of the trader's
VWAP to market VWAP, which is due to the unpredictable price movement and error in
volume forecast. We represent our objective as
min
v(t)
E[VWAP   vwap]2
Next, we rewrite the expected squared error of the VWAP execution in an explicit form
as
WE[D] + Cov
 
V (T )
V (T ) + v(T )
2
; D
!
; (3.1)
where
D =
Z T
0
((X(t)  x(t))dP (t))2;
X(t) =
V (T )  V (t)
V (T )
;
x(t) =
v(T )  v(t)
v(T )
;
W = E
"
V (T )
V (T ) + v(T )
2#
;
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x(t) here denotes the ratio of the remaining position of a trader at time t against his
initial position, namely an execution trajectory or execution strategy. X(t) represents
the market remaining trading volume against its total trading volume through the entire
process. Furthermore, since V (T ) denotes the whole market trading volume, we assume
that, compared to V (T ), v(T ) is much smaller, and V (T )=(V (T )+v(T )) has a value which
is close to 1. The covariance term of (3.1) is negligible. Taking into account that W is
calculated according to the trader's expectation, we can rewrite the objective problem as
min
x(t)
Z T
0
E[(t; V )2(X(t)  x(t))2]dt; (3.2)
and this can be simplied as
min
Z T
0
E[(t; V )2(X(t)  x(t))2]dt
=
Z T
0
E[(t; V )2X(t)2]dt
+min
Z T
0
( 2E[(t; V )2X(t)]x(t) + E[(t; V )2]x(t)2)dt (3.3)
=
Z T
0

E[(t; V )2X(t)2]  E[(t; V )
2X(t)]2
E[(t; V )2]

dt
+min
Z T
0

E[(t; V )2X(t)]
E[(t; V )2]
  x(t)
2
E[(t; V )2]dt
Next, we slice the whole execution time into v(T ) units. Here, we need to introduce a
new index tk (k = 0; 1;    ; v(T )). We have t0=0 and tv(T )=T. The execution trajectory
can be rewritten as
x(t) = 1  k
v(T )
if tk < t 6 tk+1(k = 0; 1;    ; v(T )  1)
In this way, the determination of the optimal execution trajectory x(t) is equivalent to
the determination of an optimal execution time t(k) for each units of our order. So x(t)
becomes a step function, which is continuous but not dierentiable for all points within
its domain. According to (3.3), we notice that the optimization problem has turned out
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to be an optimization that nds the step function x(t) that best ts a continuous and
dierentiable curve E[(t;V )
2X(t)]
E[(t;V )2]
. From (3.3), we have
min
Z T
0
( 2E[(t; V )2X(t)]x(t) + E[(t; V )2]x(t)2)dt
= min[
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
tk 1
( 2E[(t; V )2X(t)]x(t) + E[(t; V )2]x(t)2)dt] (3.4)
The rst half of (3.4) can be rewritten as
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
tk 1
( 2E[(t; V )2X(t)]x(t))dt
=
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
tk 1

 2E[(t; V )2X(t)](1  k   1
v(T )
)

dt
=
v(T )X
k=1
(v(T )  k + 1)
Z tk
tk 1

 2E[(t; V )
2X(t)]
v(T )

dt
=
v(T ) 1X
k=1
(v(T )  k)
Z tk
tk 1

 2E[(t; V )
2X(t)]
v(T )

dt
+
Z tv(T )
0

 2E[(t; V )
2X(t)]
v(T )

dt
=   
=
v(T ) iX
k=1
(v(T )  k   i+ 1)
Z tk
tk 1

 2E[(t; V )
2X(t)]
v(T )

dt
+
v(T )X
k=v(T ) i+1
Z tk
0

 2E[(t; V )
2X(t)]
v(T )

dt
=   
=
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
0

 2E[(t; V )
2X(t)]
v(T )

dt; (3.5)
and the second half of (3.4) as
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v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
tk 1
(E[(t; V )2]x(t)2)dt
=
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
0
(E[(t; V )2]x(tk 1)2)dt 
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk 1
t0
(E[(t; V )2]x(tk 1)2)dt
=
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
0
(E[(t; V )2]x(tk 1)2)dt 
v(T ) 1X
k=0
Z tk
0
(E[(t; V )2]x(tk)
2)dt
=
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
0
(E[(t; V )2]x(tk 1)2)dt
 [
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
0
(E[(t; V )2]x(tk)
2)dt+
Z t0
0
(E[(t; V )2]x(t0)
2)dt]
 
Z tv(T )
0
(E[(t; V )2]x(tV (t))
2)dt]
=
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
0
(E[(t; V )2][x(tk 1)2   x(tk)2])dt
=
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
0
 
E[(t; V )2]
"
v(T )  k + 1
v(T )
2
  v(T )  k
v(T )
#!
dt
=
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
0

E[(t; V )2]
2(v(T )  k) + 1
v(T )2

dt: (3.6)
Therefore, (3.4) can be written as
min
v(T )X
k=1
Z tk
0

E[(t; V )2]

2(v(T )  k) + 1
v(T )2
  2E[(t; V )
2X(t)]
v(T )E[(t; V )2]

dt:
Here, we replace the integrand with fk(t). It is easy to observe that this function is
monotonically increasing with respect to t. Moreover, we have
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fk(t

k 1) = fk 1(t

k 1) 
2
v(T )2
< fk 1(tk 1) 6 0;
fk(T ) =
2(v(T )  k) + 1
v(T )
> 0;
from which we can infer that this function will turn from negative to positive only once in
[tk 1; T ], and the turning point we are looking for is at tk.
Hence, tk satises

v(T )  k + 1
v(T )
2
  2E[X(t

k)]
v(T )
 

v(T )  k
v(T )
2
6 0;
lim
t#tk
 2E[X(t)]
v(T )
+

v(T )  k + 1
v(T )
2
 

v(T )  k
v(T )
2
> 0;
and
E[X(tk)] >
2(v(T )  k) + 1
2v(T )
> lim
t#tk
E[X(t)]
By assuming that E[X(t)] is continuous at tk we have
E[X(tk)] =
2(v(T )  k) + 1
2v(T )
;
so that,
x(tk) = 1 
k
v(T )
=
2v(T )E[X(tk)]  1
2v(T )
Note that, x(t) takes a constant value over the range of
E[X(t)] 6 E[X(tk)] < E[X(t)] +
1
v(T )
Therefore, x(t) lies in the range of
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E[X(t)]  1
2v(T )
6 x(t) < E[X(t)] + 1
2v(T )
from which we can write x(t) as
x(t) =

[(2v(T )E[X(t)] + 1)=2]
v(T )

; (3.7)
where bc represents the integer part.
For the case when E[X(t)] is not continuous at tk, the same argument also applies. In
most real cases, E[X(t)] can be measured by taking the average X(t) of the empirical data
in the past 3 days or 1 week, depending on the preference of the trader.
3.2 AMinimal Cost Algorithm: Implementation Short-
fall
While trying to minimize the expected squared error of VWAP of the trading strategy to
the market VWAP, Konishi [2] made several assumptions, including a stochastic pricing
process and a negligible market impact, and these may cause an unwanted inaccuracy in
modelling the real market. Alternatively, we can introduce the implementation shortfall
(IS) model proposed by Almgren and Chriss [3] based on a price process generated by
temporary and permanent impact functions.
Following Almgren and Chriss [3] and the assumption on the single-asset market, we
dene the initial position to be M . We divide the given time period T into N intervals,
each with length  = T=N . Also, we dene tk = k for each subsection, so that a trading
strategy, which is represented by the remaining position of the trader, is mk; (k = 1; :::; N).
We have m0 =M , mN = 0, and for any k 2 f0;    ; Ng
M  mk = v

kT
N

:
Moreover, we specify a trade list n1;    ; nN , which represents the portion that a trader
has to liquidate at each trading time. More specically, for any k 2 f0;    ; Ng, we have
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mk =M  
kX
j=0
nj:
Next, we assume the initial market price to be S0, and that the price process evolves
according to one exogenous factor: volatility, as well as two endogenous factors: the tempo-
rary market impact and the permanent market impact. We assume the execution period is
measured by days, so that we do not need to include any drift terms into this price process.
In this way, we can write the price process as
Sk = Sk 1 + 
p
k   g
nk


(3.8)
= S0 +
kX
j=1


1
2 j   g
nj


; (3.9)
where t=(1;    ; N),  represents the yearly standard deviation of the asset, and t's are
iid normal random variables. g(v) denotes the permanent impact function of the average
trading rate v = nt= within the period tk 1 to tk.
Furthermore, we model the temporary market impact, which is also a function of aver-
age trading rate. We are not going to include the temporary impact function directly into
the market price process since the impact is temporary and we assume that the market
will recover to its equilibrium state by the next trading period. In this way, the tempo-
rary impact eect will only be expressed as a dierence between the market price and the
captured price. Here, we use fSk to denote the captured price and h  nt  as the temporary
impact function, whose value depends on the trading speed nt

:
fSk = Sk 1   hnt


:
Therefore, the total capture of trading, which is calculated by summing the product of
the actual trading price ~Sk and the number of shares nk we trade during each time interval,
can be written as
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NX
k=1
nkfSk = NX
k=1
nk

Sk   h
nk


=MS0 +
NX
k=1


1
2 k   g
nk


mk  
NX
k=1
nkh
nk


=MS0 +
NX
k=1

1
2 kmk  
NX
k=1
g
nk


mk  
NX
k=1
nkh
nk


: (3.10)
The left hand side is the capture of the strategy upon completion of this execution.
From (3.10), we notice that, the rst termMS0 on the right hand side stands for the initial
market value of the order. The second term
PN
k=1 
1
2 kmk represents the total eect of
market volatility, and the third term
PN
k=1 g(
nk

)mk is the total eect of the permanent
impact, which is always represented as a loss since the price tends to move against traders,
noticeably or not. The fourth term
PN
k=1 nkh(
nk

) measures the total temporary market
impact of the execution, and it is also the dierence of the total captured revenue against
the market price, or in other words, the error revenue from execution against the theoretical
earning.
In this way, the total trading cost, which is calculated as the dierence between the
initial book value and the total capture, can be written as
MS0  
NX
k=1
nkfSk = NX
k=1
nkh
nk


 
NX
k=1


1
2 k   g
nk


mk: (3.11)
This measure of total trading cost was introduced by Perold (1988), and is called
implementation shortfall (IS). At the beginning of the execution period, we calculate the
expectation and variance of IS, and these can be written as
E(m) =
NX
k=1
mkg
nk


+
NX
k=1
nkh
nk


(3.12)
V (m) = 2
NX
k=1
m2k (3.13)
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In order to study this model and its characteristics further, we need to assume an explicit
form of each impact function. Firstly, we start with the permanent impact function. In the
real markets, executing a large order may result in a dramatic movement in the opposite
direction of the order. In the long run, although the market may recover to an equivalent
state, these operations still will undermine the condence of other investors and cause the
market's new equivalent state to deviate from its previous state. However, compared to
the market uctuation and temporary impact eect, the permanent impact eect is not as
important. For this reason, we can write it as a linear function
g
nk


= 
nk

; (3.14)
where  is a pre-determined constant that can be measured empirically or determined
according to a trader's expectation. By plugging (3.14) into (3.10), we have the permanent
impact term rewritten as
NX
t=1
g(
nt

)mt = 
NX
k=1
mknk
= 
NX
k=1
mk(mk 1  mk)
=
1
2

NX
k=1
(m2k 1  m2k   (mk  mk 1)2)
=
1
2

 
M2  
NX
t=1
n2t
!
:
Also, the price process can be rewritten as
Sk = S0 + 
kX
j=1

1
2 j   (M  mk):
Similarly, we can make a further assumption that the temporary impact function ts a
linear function as well. So we assume a temporary impact function of the form
30
h
nt


= sgn(nt) +


nt; (3.15)
in which,  and  are pre-determined constants, and sgn() is the sign function dened as
sgn(x) =
8><>:
1 if x > 0
0 if x = 0
 1 if x < 0
(3.16)
A reasonable estimation for  is the xed costs of selling, such as half the bid-ask spread
plus transaction fees.
In this way, we rewrite the expectation of impact cost as
E(m) =
1
2
M2 + 
NX
k=1
jnkj+ ~

NX
k=1
n2k; (3.17)
where ~ =    1
2
 .
Here, we construct our optimal strategy by minimizing the expectation of our trading
cost with a given maximum level of variance V:
min
m:V (m)6V
E(m): (3.18)
We solve the constraint optimization problem in (3.18) by introducing a Lagrangian
multiplier  and convert it to an unconstrained problem
min
m
(E(m) + V (m)): (3.19)
 can be interpreted as the trader's coecient of risk aversion. We set
U(m) = E(m) + V (m):
According to (3.17), the expected transaction cost is strictly convex. Moreover, for
 > 0, (3.19) is also strictly convex. Therefore, by setting its partial derivatives to zero,
we can obtain the unique global minimum of U(m)
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@U
@mk
= 2

2mk   ~mk 1   2mk +mk+1
 2

= 0:
So, we have
1
 2
(mk 1   2mk +mk+1) = 
2
~
mk = ~
2mk: (3.20)
We notice that the solution to this linear dierential equation according to the optimal
trading trajectory mk can be written as a combination of the exponentials exp(tk),
where  satises
2
 2
(cosh()  1) = ~2; (3.21)
~ and ~ denote an innitesimal asymptotic correction of  and : as  ! 0, we have ~ ! 
and ~! . The optimal trading trajectory can be written as
mk =
sinh((T   tk))
sinh(T )
M k = 0;    ; N;
and the associated trading portion for each period is
nk =
2sinh(1
2
)
sinh(T )
cosh((T   tk  1
2
))M; j = 1;    ; N;
where tk  1
2
= (k   1
2
) .
Therefore, the expectation and variance of trading cost of the optimal execution strategy
for a given initial order size M can be expressed as
E(M) =
1
2
M2 + M + ~M2
tanh(1
2
)(sinh(2T ) + 2Tsinh())
2 2sinh2(T )
V (M) =
1
2
2M2
sinh(T )cosh((T   ))  Tsinh()
sinh2(T )sinh()
:
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Figure 3.1: Linear Temporary Impact Eect
3.3 An Alternative IS Strategy with Quadratic Tem-
porary Impact
In (3.15), we follow the work of Almgren and Chriss [3] and made a strong assumption
that the temporary impact eect is a linear function proportional to trading rate nt

, with
an analytical solution to the optimization problem. Figure 3.1 shows an example of the
modelled linear temporary impact eect. We notice that there exists a sharp turning point
where the market rapidly switches from a recovering state to an equilibrium state. If the
depth of the temporary impact eect exceeds a certain level or the recovering period is
relatively short, the linear function loses its eciency in modelling the temporary impact
eect due to the sharp turning point, since the real market is a collection of numerous
heterogeneous individuals and abrupt reversal is not realistic. In order to smoothly ap-
proximate the market impact, we introduce an alternative strategy by replacing the linear
temporary impact model with a quadratic one:
h
nk


=

+ 
n2k


sgn(nk):
So the total temporary impact term of (3.12) can be written as
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Figure 3.2: Quadratic Temporary Impact Eect
NX
k=1
nkh(
nk

) =
NX
k=1
nksgn(nk)

+ 
n2k


=
NX
k=1

jnkj+  jnkj
3


;
and the expectation of implementation shortfall can be written as
E(m) =
1
2
M2   1
2

NX
k=1
n2k +


NX
k=1
jnkj3:
Here, we follow Algmren and Chriss [3] by assuming that no reversal operation is
allowed, which means that all nk have identical signs. We further assume that nk > 0 for
k 2 (1;    ; N), so that we have
E(m) =
1
2
M2   1
2

NX
k=1
n2k +


NX
k=1
n3k;
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and the target function turns out to be
U(m) = E(m) + V (x)
=
1
2
M2   1
2

NX
k=1
n2k +


NX
k=1
n3k + 
2
NX
k=1
m2k: (3.22)
By replacing the temporary impact function with a quadratic one, the nal target
function (3.22) becomes a non-convex cubic function.
For simplicity, we apply the genetic algorithm to solve this analytically-intractable
optimization problem. Note that, in order to implement numerical methods, we need to
add some constraints into the original optimization problem. We rewrite the nal constraint
optimization problem as
min U(m)
s:t mk 1 6 mk k 2 (1;    ; N)
3.3.1 Genetic Algorithm for Numerical Optimization
In order to explain the procedure of solving this optimization problem numerically using the
genetic algorithm, we need to set up an initial value for parameters , ,  and . Following
the study of Almgren and Chirss [3], we set parameters  = 2:5  10 7,  = 2:5  10 6,
 = 1 10 6 and  = 1:9.
 Genetic Operation: Selection
As we have mentioned before, selection is the rst step of the reproduction process.
It is done randomly with a probability depending on the corresponding tness of the
individuals so that the best ones are more likely to be chosen for reproduction over
the poor ones [34].
In this case, we choose the roulette wheel selection method as our selection algorithm.
Firstly, we set the population of each generation to be 200, 5% of which comes
directly from the top 5% elites of the previous generation, 76% from crossover of
their parents and 19% from mutation. The number of parents needed to reproduce
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the next generation is 152  2 + 38 = 342, each of them contains 10 numbers that
represent the 10 steps trading strategy. We next assign each individual of the rst
generation with a probability corresponding to their tness score, and then randomly
draw 342 times from this population of 200 to select a parents set.
 Genetic Operation: Crossover
Next, we will perform a crossover operation in order to reproduce the next generation.
We randomly pick two individuals from the parents set, namely, r1 and r2. In Table
3.1, we present an example of a pair of parents selected from one simulation. We
generate a binary string, where 0 means that we select the genes at the corresponding
position from parent r1 and 1 represents a selection from parent r2. In doing this, we
have a new string of numbers representing an individual in the next generation, and
a new trading trajectory at the same time. According to Table 3.1, by crossover, the
new individual is lucky enough to have a lower score, which means a better tness
than both of its parents. In most cases, the new individual will not be that lucky to
have such an improvement over its parents, and will be abandoned as the iteration
goes on.
Genome of Individuals Score
r1
0.1982 0.1962 0.1156 0.1159 0.1027
9.5218e+10
0.0998 0.0582 0.0446 0.0365 0.0338
r2
0.1598 0.1565 0.1226 0.1172 0.1168
1.0373e+11
0.1157 0.0859 0.0496 0.0452 0.0312
Kid
0.1982 0.1565 0.1226 0.1172 0.1027
9.4824e+10
0.1157 0.0582 0.0496 0.0452 0.0338
Table 3.1: Crossover Operation
 Genetic Operation: Mutation
The third step is mutation, where 19% of the population is randomly chosen using
a roulette wheel selection method and mutate into new individuals. A new 10-digit
string composed of 1, 0 and -1 will be randomly generated according to a pre-set
mutate possibility, which in this case is set to be 10%. It means that each digit of
this string has a 5% probability to mutate from 0 to 1 and a 5% probability from
0 to -1. With a reasonable step size, chromosomes will mutate toward the direction
determined by the direction matrix. In the example shown in Table 3.2, the step size
is set to be 1. We can see that the score of the mutated new individual is slightly
higher than its parent. This means that mutation causes a negative eect to the
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individual, and this individual will most likely be washed out as the iteration goes
on.
Genome of Individuals Score
r1
0.3002 0.2126 0.1639 0.1079 0.0481
1.2331e+11
0.0443 0.0425 0.0424 0.0235 0.0146
Kid
0.3002 0.2126 0.1639 0.1080 0.0481
1.2290e+11
0.0442 0.0425 0.0425 0.0234 0.0146
Table 3.2: Mutate Operation
 Optimization
By genetic operations, a generation will pass its out-standing genes to the next gen-
eration or generate new genome through crossover and mutation. A new genome
which improves the tness will be more likely to survive while others will have a
higher possibility of being abandoned. In Table 3.3, we present the best individual
that ts the environment in selected generations, and the corresponding tness score.
Among the 200 randomly-generated individuals in the rst generation, the individual
with a score of 9:7581108 shows the best tness. Individuals with the top 10 scores
will be able to reproduce 10 o-springs, each of them carrying exactly the same in-
formation as its parent. Crossover and mutation will occur among the rest of the 190
individuals from the rst generation when they are reproducing their kids. After no
more than 21 generations, individuals with not-so-at trading curves are produced
and proven to have a better survivability. One example of such an individual is the
one we presented at the 22th generation. In this way, individuals keep evolving until
the 956th generation. After 200 more generations we nd that no signicantly better
individual has been produced. So we come to the conclusion that the individual with
a tness score of 8:2253  107 is one of the best ts for this environment, and this
means that 8:2253 107 is a numerical solution to this optimization problem which
we are looking for.
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Generation Genome of Individuals Score
1
0.4459 0.2348 0.1956 0.1011 0.0188
9.7581e+08
0.0038 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
8
0.9989 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001
2.4500e+08
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
22
0.7219 0.2768 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002
1.2014e+08
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
50
0.7188 0.2775 0.0023 0.0006 0.0006
1.1941e+08
0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
250
0.6620 0.2825 0.0254 0.0080 0.0070
1.0928e+08
0.0052 0.0038 0.0038 0.0021 0.0000
500
0.6198 0.2827 0.0429 0.0128 0.0123
1.0110e+08
0.0094 0.0080 0.0073 0.0046 0.0000
816
0.5474 0.2738 0.0731 0.0269 0.0208
8.6858e+07
0.0170 0.0156 0.0145 0.0110 0.0000
1000
0.5207 0.3251 0.0742 0.0231 0.0144
8.2302e+07
0.0129 0.0113 0.0101 0.0082 0.0000
1016
0.5222 0.3246 0.0738 0.0228 0.0142
8.2253e+07
0.0135 0.0110 0.0099 0.0081 0.0000
Table 3.3: Best individuals among their generations
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Chapter 4
Framework of the Articial Stock
Market
As we have mentioned before, most existing methods for analysing optimal execution
strategies fail to consider the potential impact of large orders on market price data that
they use. In this chapter, we introduce an articial stock market system, which is able to
include the market impact and reaction into its price formation process.
The most fundamental and important part of an articial stock market is the price
formation mechanism. In this thesis, this mechanism is built based on a simple logic that
matches the market demands and supplies and nds an equilibrium price in a limit-order
book.
As for agents, a traditional way to model agents' behaviours is to divide the population
into several groups, and assign each group with a specic trading strategy, such as funda-
mental analysis, technical analysis or noise trading. Raberto and Cincotti [35] found that,
in such a framework, there always exists one group that greatly out-performs others, and
this leads to convergence of the market wealth distribution and the market is determined
to reduce its volatility since the out-standing group may take over the whole market. To
solve this,agent aggregation based on an agent clustering mechanism can be applied ac-
cording to the model in Cont and Bouchaud [36]. Moreover, agents' uncertainty about
the market price can also be modelled by introducing a random variable into the decision
making process.
In this thesis, we follow Peter [37] and assume that the market evolves in discrete steps.
We assign N traders into the market with the i-th trader denoted by its subscript i. t
represents the current time and the corresponding market price is denoted as p(t). Ci(t)
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and Ai(t) stand for the amount of cash and assets held by the i-th trader at time t. These
traders will place buy orders with probability Pi or sell orders with possibility 1   Pi at
each trading time.
4.1 Order Formation Mechanism
Firstly, we assume that the i-th trader places a sell order with size asi at time t+1, which
is a random portion of his stock position at time t:
asi = briAi(t)c;
where ri is a random number uniformly drawn from the interval [0,1] and bc denotes the
integer part.
Secondly, we assign a limit price si to each sell order:
si = p(t)LNi(s; i);
where LNi(s; i) denotes a random draw from a lognormal distribution with average s
and standard deviation i. Here, following Raberto [4], we set s = 0:99. This means,
without taking other market information into consideration, that the mean value of all
sell orders is more likely to be slightly lower than the market price p(t). It is a realistic
assumption since rational investors always tend to place sell orders at slightly lower prices
in order to liquidize their orders more quickly. Also, with s = 0:99, we manually set up a
spread between bid and ask prices. Also, trading in a market with only limit-order book,
agents may try to execute their orders at prices no lower than their expectation.
Thirdly, the investors' uncertainty about the market price may increase in a nervous
market, and this will result in a higher volatility of stock price:
i = k(fi);
where k denotes a constant and fi stands for a factor calculated by the i-th trader using
empirical volatility data. Note that this factor varies from dierent agents since each
investor analyses the market condition in his own way. The individual volatility
2t (fi) =
JX
j=1
iju
2
t j;
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where ij denotes the attached weight for the i
th agent and ut denotes the return, with
expression ut = log
p(t)
p(t 1) . Here we take the uncertainty as a form of exponentially weighted
moving average, which means that the weight j can be written as
i(j+1) = e
 fiij;
We notice that, with an fi close to 0, the agent assigns the volatility in the past J
days almost the same weight. This means that, when analysing the market information,
the agent will put more weight on the market trend instead of on the recent market event.
With an fi close to 1, the agent pays more attention on the new market information in the
past few days and only take the trend of volatility for reference.
Conversely, a buy order is generated in a symmetrical way with
ci = riCi(t);
which denotes the amount of cash an agent may spend in building up his position at time t.
ri is a random draw from a uniform distribution in the interval [0,1]. Also, the associated
limit price of this buy order can be written as
bi =
p(t)
LNi(b; i)
;
where LNi(s; i) denotes a random draw from a log-normal distribution with average s
and standard deviation i. The minimum number of shares that the agent is able to buy
is calculated as
abi = [
ci
bi
]:
ri and Ni(; ) will be generated independently for each agent at each time step. By
analysing empirical volatility of market price under the constraint of limited resources of
each agent, we hope to be able to capture the heterogeneous random behaviour on the part
of the investors.
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4.2 Market Clearing Mechanism
The price formation mechanism is modelled by nding the equilibrium price of the supply
and demand curves.
To compute the supplies and demands curves, we have to assume that the agents
have placed U buy orders and V sell orders at time t+1. We denote the pair (abu; bu),
u = 1; 2;    ; U to be the quantity of shares to buy and the associated limit price. Likewise,
we also set the pair (asv; sv), v = 1; 2;    ; V to be the quantity of shares to sell and the
associated limit price. Then, we can dene the demand function at time t+1 to be
Dt+1(p) =
UX
u=1jbu>p
abu;
where Dt+1(p) denotes the total amount of shares that the market will demand when the
equilibrium price is p. It shows a decreasing trend with respect to price p: with a higher
price, fewer buyers can be satised, and fewer buy order can be executed. When p is
greater than the maximum value of limit buy price, no buy order will be executed.
Similarly, the supply function can be written as the number of shares that will be sold
when the equilibrium price is p:
St+1 =
VX
v=1jsv6p
asv;
In our case the equilibrium price p sometimes can be referred to as the market clearing
price, since it represents an optimal point at which the market will execute most orders.
It is determined by nding the intersection of the demand and the supply curves.
Figure 4.1 shows the supply and demand curve based on a sample simulation. We
notice that, both the demand and the supply curves are step functions. Hence, in most
cases, the equation D(p) = S(p) does not hold. Under this circumstance, we need to
introduce a market maker, whose capital size is innitely large so as to absorb any small
amount of orders due to the demand and supply dierence at the clearing price. It is
a widely accepted but strong assumption since the market will not be completely closed
under this assumption. After each period, orders with limit prices not compatible with the
clearing price will be discarded, others will be executed, and the cash and stock position
of their agents will thus be updated.
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Figure 4.1: Demand and Supply Curve
4.3 Information Propagation Mechanism
Usually, agents are modelled with absolute independence, producing a log return that
follows a normal distribution. The associated long-term price behaviour will also follow a
random walk [38].
In order to simulate pricing behaviours in the real market, such as market return
with fat tails following a Pareto-Levi distribution [39, 40], we introduce the random graph
approach for constructing an agents' social network [41]. Following the research of Raberto
and Bouchaud [4, 41], we stipulate that the cluster size distribution follows an inverse power
law. Instead of having a constant probability Pi for each agent to place a buy order, we
introduce an opinion propagation mechanism that updates the decision-making algorithm
dependent on the clustering eect. In the following, we provide an explanation of this
mechanism.
Firstly, at the beginning of each trading period, clusters will form between two random
agents with probability Pa. One agent can be engaged into dierent clusters simultane-
ously. Dierent clusters containing the same agent can be treated as a large single cluster
as a whole. This mechanism is designed to simulate the market public information. Inter-
pretations of a same public information may vary among agents, and agents in the same
cluster share similar opinions on that information.
Secondly, after forming market-wise clusters, private information such as rumours or
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insider information, is introduced into the market with probability Pc, and it will be ac-
quired by random clusters. Once informed, agents that belong to chosen clusters will be
over-condent with the information they acquire. They will make bold and not-so-rational
decisions: either buying stocks using 90% of their cash positions or selling 90% of their
stock positions. After positions of agents have been updated across the market, clusters
will be disbanded and all agents will become independent again.
We will present our results of empirical studies based on this market structure in the
next chapter.
44
Chapter 5
Results of Empirical Analysis
5.1 Choice of Parameters
5.1.1 Parameters of Articial Stock Market
In order to examine the simulation results and statistical properties of the articial stock
market, we will start by initiating the system parameters. The market price of the traded
stock p0 is set to be $100:00 per share for simplicity. The number of agents involved in the
simulation N is set to be 100 as a compromise to computational capacity of hardware due
to the exponentially increasing computational complexity.
At the beginning, each agent holds a cash position of $10; 000:00 and a stock position
of 100 shares. The parameters that determine the uctuations in limit prices (ki; fi; i)
do not have a direct inuence on the time-series properties of our system. By tuning the
system, we nally reach an optimal value for ki equals to 3.5. The time window of each
trader to conduct analysis Ti and the interval within the individual factor fi for each agent
are specied as Ti = 30 and fi 2 [0:5; 0:9]. In each trading interval, the probability for an
independent agent to place a buy order Pi is set to be 50%, so the probability for placing
place a sell order 1  Pi is also 50%. Following the work of Raberto [4], we set the spread
of the average limit price for buy and sell orders to be 0.02, the probability of forming a
link between two agents is Pa = 0:1, and the probability of information leaking to a certain
cluster is set to be 0.05.
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5.1.2 Parameters of Optimal Execution Strategies
A numerical example of the model provides deeper insight into optimal execution strategies.
Following Almgren [3], we rstly assume that the single stock in the market has an initial
price S0 = $100:00 and the initial order size is M = 5; 000 shares.
Secondly, we assume that the annual volatility of the stock is a = 0:3, and the annual
return ra = 0:1. Also, the stock has a bid-ask spread with a value of 1/8 and a median
daily trading volume of 5,000,000 shares. Given that a year consists of 250 trading days,
the absolute parameter  and  can be calculated as
 = 100 0:3p
250
= 1:90
 = 100 0:1
250
= 0:04
Thirdly, we assume that investors want their orders to be executed within less than 10
time steps. This means T=10,  = 1 and N=10. The time window for the investor to
estimate E[X(t)] is also set to be Te = 10 trading periods.
Fourthly, we stipulate the xed part of the temporary impact in (3.15) to be half of
the bid-ask spread,  = 1=16, and assume that every investor incurs a price impact equals
to the bid-ask spread for every 1% of the daily trading volume. For instance, trading at a
rate of 5% of the daily volume incurs a cost of 5/8 on each trade. In this way,  dened in
(3.15) is calculated as
 =
1
8
 1
0:01 5 106 = 2:5 10
 6
Fifthly, as for the permanent impact, we assume that the impact becomes signicant
if an investor places an order with a minimum size of 10% of the daily trading volume.
A signicant impact means that the price goes against the trade direction by one bid-
ask spread, and the eect is assumed to be linear regardless of the order's size. Thus we
calculate  which is rst seen in (3.14) as
 =
1
8
 1
0:1 5 106 = 2:5 10
 7
At last, we choose the coecient of the investors' risk aversion in (3.19) to be  = u =
1 10 6 and  is calculated as
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Figure 5.1: Trading Trajectory of Minimum Risk VWAP Algorithm
  ~+ 
( 2) 
q
2

+ 
() 
q
110 62
2:510 6  1:27
Figures 5.1, 5.3 and 5.4 are examples of simulated trading trajectories of the minimum
risk VWAP strategy and IS strategies with the linear and quadratic temporary impact
functions.
We notice from Figure 5.1 that the execution trajectory of the minimum risk VWAP
exhibits a slight uctuation while attaining a monotonically decreasing trend, for the reason
that the VWAP algorithm aims to minimize the dierence of executed VWAP and market
VWAP. Moreover, the curve of the execution trajectory does not have a constant convexity
since the trajectory is dependent on the market trading volume in the past few days. Note
that, here we use a sample of simulated trading volume data from the articial stock
market in order to implement the minimum risk VWAP algorithm. Figure 5.2 presents
the comparison between the market VWAP and the investor's predicted VWAP during the
same period of time. A similar trend can be clearly observed from the gure. Also, by
showing small deviations in the rst several steps and relatively larger but still acceptable
dierences in the last three steps, Figure 5.2 indicates that the investor's prediction is
reliable during the execution period, with more accuracy at the rst few steps.
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Figure 5.2: Market VWAP and Investor's VWAP
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 depict the simulated results of the IS model using the linear and
quadratic temporary impact functions. According to the formulas we introduced earlier,
both of these algorithms are sensitive to the agents' coecients of risk aversion, or in other
word, their risk preferences. We will include the outcomes of these two strategies based on
dierent risk preferences, but for now, by setting both of the coecients to be  = 110 6,
we are able to have a clearer comparison of them.
From Figures 5.3 and 5.4, we see that both models lead to convex trading trajectories
with higher trading speed at the beginning and a lower speed in the end. It is consistent
with our assumption that the curve will show convexity, reinforcing the notion that the
greater portion of the order should be executed within the rst few steps of an execution
process, because the longer apart, the higher the opportunity costs. Moreover, the trading
trajectory with the linear impact implementation shortfall model shows a much deeper
curve, which means that those investors are less sensitive to impact risk. They tend to
liquidize their orders as fast as possible when the market price moves against them. On
the other hand, the curve shown in Figure 5.4 suggests that investors using the quadratic
impact implementation shortfall model care more about the market impact, for the reason
that the market impact grows quadratically against the trading speed. In order to control
the execution cost, investors choose to liquidize their orders in a gentler way.
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Figure 5.3: Trading Trajectory of Linear Impact Implementation Shortfall Algorithm
Figure 5.4: Trading Trajectory of Quadratic Impact Implementation Shortfall Algorithm
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5.2 Investor's Preference
In order to further study the trading trajectories of the implementation shortfall strategies,
agents will be assigned with dierent risk preferences. We are not able to include this
diversity into the minimum risk VWAP case since the model does not contain any factor
concerning risk adjustment. However, the risk preference is already incorporated in the
model since  measures risk aversion, in both the linear-impact and quadratic-impact
implementation shortfall cases. Judging from the basic assumptions of these two models,
the curve of the optimal trading trajectory should bend more with a larger coecient of
risk aversion, for the reason that a large coecient of risk aversion leads to a lower risk
tolerance and a faster trading speed.
Figure 5.5: Trading trajectories of Linear-impact Implementation Shortfall model
In Figures 5.5 and 5.6, we present the corresponding trading trajectories of the linear-
impact and quadratic-impact implementation shortfall model with the coecient of risk
aversion  being 1 10 5, 1 10 6 ,1 10 7 and 1 10 8 respectively.
From Figures 5.5 and 5.6, we see that the trajectories of the linear-impact IS strategy
are more sensitive to the changes of the coecients of risk aversion. With  equalling to
1 10 8, the model ignores the risk preference of the investors and poses an approximate-
ly linear trajectory with a minimum market impact risk. When  is equal to 1  10 5,
the corresponding trading strategy is to execute the whole order at the rst trading date,
ignoring the ensuing market impact. As for the case of the quadratic-impact implementa-
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Figure 5.6: Trading trajectories of Quadratic-impact Implementation Shortfall model
tion shortfall model, the model places more weight on the market impact than the market
uctuation and this results in conservative trading strategies.
In the following section, we will implement these strategies based on the articial stock
market we constructed, and present the simulation results as well as the statistical proper-
ties of our market when a certain number of investors are assigned with optimal execution
strategies.
5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Firstly, we start with a simulation without optimal execution strategies. Figure 5.7 shows
the price process of the articial stock market with 5,000 time steps. The maximum price
is $122:59 and the minimum is $45:27. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 present the daily return and
absolute daily return of the simulated market respectively.
A pattern of mean reversion is observed in these time series, suggesting that the time
series are likely to be stationary. Also, there appear to be signs of uneven uctuations
over the sample period, providing the evidence of clustered volatility in various sub-sample
periods. Moreover, there is also a strong evidence of persistence of the squared and absolute
return as indicated in the plots, measuring volatility of return from dierent perspectives.
Figure 5.11 is the histogram of the market daily return and Figure 5.12 is the quantile-
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Figure 5.7: Market Price Process
Figure 5.8: Market Daily Return
quantile plot of the market daily return against normal distribution. Both the histogram
and QQ plot indicate a signicant departure from normality on both tails.
In Table 5.1 we present descriptive statistics for the daily return of our simulated
market, the Jarque-Bera test for normality, and Ljung-Box-Pierce Q(K) test for the joint
insignicance of autocorrelation coecients with K = 5. The distribution of the daily
return is clearly non-normal with negative skewness and pronounced excess kurtosis, and
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Figure 5.9: Market Absolute Daily Return
Figure 5.10: Market Trading Volume
this is consistent with the observations from the US market data.
The Q(K) test does not reject H0 that the sample autocorrelation coecients at the
rst-lag are jointly 0, but rejects H0 for the last 4 lags. The results from the joint tests
conrm the results reported above on the evidence of non-normality at the 95% condence
level.
Secondly, after a quick glance at the market statistics, we move on to comparing the
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Figure 5.11: Histogram of Market Daily Return
Figure 5.12: QQ-Plot of Market Daily Return
impact of the optimal execution strategies on the articial market as well as the protability
of investors. The percentage of institutional traders that implement the optimal execution
strategies is set to be 10% and will remain constant. Table 5.2 presents the descriptive
statistics of the simulated market daily return data. We see that the changes of statistics
of the articial market remain at a low level. The market with the minimum risk VWAP
strategy out-performs the other two in terms of volatility of the market return. This
indicates a smaller market impact driven by the minimum risk VWAP strategy.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics and Tests
Descriptive Statistics of Market Daily Return
Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
 8:1410 10 5 0.0098 -0.1927 6.0870
Jarque-Bera Test
Test Statistic p-value Decision
2:0163 103 0.001 Reject H0 Strongly
Ljung-Box-Pierce Q(K) test
Lag 1 2 3 4 5
Test Statistic 3.1007 14.0892 29.9518 36.0237 50.9611
p-value 0.0723 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Reject H0? Not at 6% or less Yes Yes Yes Yes
Moreover, the performances of investors who use the minimum risk VWAP strategy are
the same as that of the market, since the main idea of the minimum risk VWAP strategy
is following the market trading pace in order to hide their orders and minimize the market
impact. Whereas, those two implementation shortfall strategies are seen to create small
excess returns over the market. Given this, the question is how the market and return will
vary under dierent market circumstances when the institutional investors are using those
two implementation shortfall strategies and if there are any advantages or disadvantages
between these two strategies.
5.4 Impact on Market Quality
Liquidity, volatility, clarity, eciency, reliability and fairness are six generally accepted
measures of market quality. Considering that eciency, clarity, reliability and fairness
are qualitative measures and hard to compare, we follow [42] and focus on the study of
the change of market liquidity and volatility to reveal the impacts of IS strategies on our
articial stock market.
5.4.1 Impact on Liquidity
According to [43], liquidity is the cost that a trader has to pay in order to complete his
order immediately. In a more liquidized market, a trader will need to pay less for a fast
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Table 5.2: Comparison Among Dierent Strategies
Market Daily Return Without Optimal Execution Strategies
Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
 8:141 10 5 0.0098 -0.1927 6.0870
Protability
Market Return Institution Return Noise Return
-33.43% -33.26% -33.49%
Market Daily Return With Minimum Risk VWAP Strategy
Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
 5:2317 10 5 0.0050 -0.0664 5.6874
Protability
Market Return Institution Return Noise Return
-23.01% -22.96% -23.05%
Market Daily Return With Linear-impact Implementation Shortfall Strategy
Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
 2:0734 10 4 0.0078 -0.1704 5.8604
Protability
Market Return Institution Return Noise Return
-62.16% -58.27% -64.49%
Market Daily Return With Quadratic-impact Implementation Shortfall Strategy
Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
 1:1499 10 4 0.0074 -0.2182 6.4555
Protability
Market Return Institution Return Noise Return
-42.77% -36.63% -44.95%
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execution, and vice versa. In that way, liquidity has been regarded as the most important
indicator of market quality. Optimal market depth (OMD) is used in [44] to measure the
market liquidity.
OMD =
Qcall +Qbid
2
;
where Qcall is the size of sell orders at the clear price and Qbid is the size of buy orders
at the clear price. We also follow the study of [45] and introduce the Amihud illiquidity
measure (ILQ) into our analysis.
ILQt =
1
t
tX
i=1
jRij
V olt
;
where Ri is the daily return and V olt is the daily trading volume of a stock. The Amihud
illiquidity measure represents the average daily absolute stock return over trading volume,
and it serves as a rough measure of the stock price impact.
Figure 5.13: Liquidity Measure Without IS Strategy
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Here, we present comparison results of the market impact of the two IS strategies on the
quality of the articial stock market. Figures 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 present the optimal market
depth and the Amihud measure in dierent markets. From these graphs, we notice that
after carrying out the IS strategies, the curves of the Amihud illiquidity measure show a
trend that shifts downwards, indicating a lower average daily return to trading volume ratio
and higher liquidity. As for the optimal market depth indicator, no signicant change can
be observed for the reason of its high volatility. So in Table 5.3, we present the statistical
features of both the optimal market depth and Amihud illiquidity measure for comparison.
Figure 5.14: Liquidity Measure With Linear IS Strategy
Table 5.3: Market Liquidity Measures
Optimal Market Depth Amihud illiquidity Measure
Mean StdDev SEM Mean StdDev SEM
Without Slicing 32.0520 4.0998 0.0580 7.4618e-04 5.9196e-05 1.8719e-06
Linear IS 33.2556 4.0532 0.0573 5.4262e-04 8.8816e-05 1.2560e-06
Quadratic IS 34.0563 4.0746 0.0576 3.9559e-04 8.7700e-05 1.2403e-06
Table 5.3 presents the statistical features of the corresponding indicators. It indicates
that, with 10% of agents using IS strategies, the market with the quadratic-impact IS
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Figure 5.15: Liquidity Measure With Quadratic IS Strategy
strategy shows the highest optimal market depth and the lowest illiquidity measure. And
the market with no optimal execution strategy has the lowest optimal market depth and
the highest illiquidity measure. This result is consistent with our assumption since both
the high optimal market depth and low illiquidity measure indicate a highly liquidated
market.
We think that the main reason IS strategies improve market liquidity is that these
strategies slice large orders into fragments, so that not only is the market impact diluted,
but those orders also provide extra liquidity to the market when agents would otherwise
not conduct any trading activities. Moreover, since the direction of the order is already
determined, agents using order slicing strategies will be continuously executing a small
fragment of the order in the following several trading periods, even when the market is
moving against them. This feature ensures some extra liquidity when the market is boom-
ing or collapsing. And at the same time it ensures the agents to receive a preferable price
when their gambles turn out to be wrong in the short term. Just as Foucault, Kadan and
Kandel(2008)[46] explain, an algorithmic trading strategy prots from providing liquidity
to the market. Since the order size is signicantly small and trading frequency is high,
traders will have a better chance in successfully executing an order and will be more likely
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to capture rather than pay the market spread [47].
Furthermore, we also notice that the standard deviation of the Amihud illiquidity mea-
sure of the market without the IS strategies is signicantly smaller than that of the market
with the two IS strategies. We think that this is due to the settings of our articial stock
market since even the institutional investors will not perform any special trading strategies
within the rst 30 trading periods.
5.4.2 Impact on Volatility
Apart from liquidity, volatility is also an important indicator of market quality, and it
measures the risk of holding an asset. It is accepted that a lower volatility indicates better
market stability. We introduce the daily volatility of return (DVR) as a measure of the
market volatility:
DV R = StdDev(lnPt   lnPt 1) (5.1)
Since the protability of an optimal execution strategy comes from its low market
impact of large orders, we can expect a lower market volatility from the market with the
IS strategies. In Table 5.4 we present the statistics of market price and market daily log
return as a measure of market volatility.
Price StdDev
Daily Log Return
Mean StdDev SEM
Without Slicing 22.9961 -8.1410e-05 0.0098 1.3811e-04
Linear IS 17.7575 -2.0734e-04 0.0078 1.1880e-04
Quadratic IS 15.2661 -1.1499e-04 0.0074 1.0469e-04
Table 5.4: Market Volatility Measures
According to Table 5.4, both markets with the two IS strategies feature lower volatil-
ity of market price and daily log return, compared to the market without the optimal
execution strategy. In terms of market volatility, the market with the quadratic-impact
implementation shortfall again outperforms the one with the linear-impact implementation
shortfall strategy.
In summary, the existence of the implementation shortfall strategy reduces volatility of
both market price and daily log return, providing evidence that the market becomes more
stable due to the IS strategies. Moreover, the IS strategy with a quadratic temporary
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impact function performs better in stabilizing the market than with a linear temporary
impact function.
5.5 Impact on Performance and Trading Cost
The articial stock market has a higher liquidity and volatility, with 10% of its agents using
the implementation shortfall strategies. However, the original objective of developing these
optimal execution strategies is not to improve the market quality, but to help agents to
reduce the trading cost incurred in executing large orders, and to increase their protability.
In the articial stock market of a single stock asset with agents sharing the same
pricing and timing strategies, the average buy/sell price (ABP/ASP) can be regarded as a
measurement of the average trading cost. By comparing the average ratio of the buy/sell
price between institutional investors who are using the IS strategies and the rest of the
market (noise investors), we are able to see the impact of the IS strategies on the trading
cost.
Table 5.5: Average Trade Prices and Protabilities
Noise Return Institution Return Dierence
Linear IS -0.6449 -0.5827 0.0622
Quadratic IS -0.4495 -0.3663 0.0832
Table 5.6: Average Trading Cost Comparison
Average Buy Price
Institutional Investors Noise Investors ABPInstitution
ABPMarketMean StdDev SEM Mean StdDev SEM
Linear IS 54.4100 2.0272 0.6411 53.4854 2.1045 0.2218 1.0173
Quadratic IS 41.8484 0.4674 0.1478 41.5377 0.4173 0.0440 1.0075
Average Sell Price
Institutional Investors Noise Investors ASPInstitution
ASPMarketMean StdDev SEM Mean StdDev SEM
Linear IS 54.3821 1.9989 0.6321 51.2352 2.0123 0.2121 1.0614
Quadratic IS 41.8096 0.4471 0.1414 39.7226 0.4589 0.0484 1.0525
Table 5.5 presents the portfolio return of the institutional investors and the noise in-
vestors. The results shown in Table 5.6 indicate that institutional investors who use the
linear and quadratic temporary impact IS strategies have higher average ratios. Both the
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linear and quadratic temporary impact IS strategies endow investors with excess returns of
around 7% above noise investors. Most of the excess prots come from a relatively higher
average selling price. In both cases, the average selling price of the institutional investors
exceeds those of the noise investors by around 5% to 6% while the average buying price
is much closer. The higher average sell price suggests that the implementation shortfall
strategy enables investors to capture a better sell price, even in a bear market where the
market value shrinks by more than 40%.
However, there is no signicant dierence between the performances of the linear tem-
porary impact IS strategy and that of quadratic temporary impact IS strategy.
5.6 Competitive Analysis with Variant Market Pa-
rameters
5.6.1 Investors' Composition
Under the condition that 10% of the agents in the articial stock market are institutional
investors, the agents trading with the quadratic temporary impact implementation shortfall
strategy contribute more to the improvement of market quality. In this subsection, we will
further study the market reaction when the market composition changes.
The deterministic factor that aects the protability of a trading algorithm is the
composition of the market. Special and eective algorithms usually come from specic
designs of market composition, and the impact of an algorithm upon dierent markets may
also vary. The market generally consists of two basic factors, the population of participants
and the choice of algorithm.
Table 5.7: Market Quality Indicators
Linear IS Quadratic IS
OMD ILQ StdPrice StdRet OMD ILQ StdPrice StdReturn
5% 33.6795 5.3050e-04 16.3953 0.0083 34.7375 3.3920e-04 8.6718 0.0079
10% 33.2556 5.4262e-04 17.7575 0.0078 34.0563 3.9559e-04 15.2661 0.0074
15% 34.4665 6.9537e-04 14.5339 0.0074 33.4780 4.1415e-04 12.9438 0.0090
30% 33.7595 8.4370e-04 18.1877 0.0099 34.8605 4.9368e-04 9.9963 0.0097
As mentioned earlier, the articial stock market consists of the noise investors and a
certain number of institutional investors who are capable of using the optimal execution
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Table 5.8: Portfolio Return
Linear Temporary Impact Implementation Shortfall
Institutional Investors Noise Traders
RexcessAveBuy AveSell Return AveBuy AveSell Return
5% 68.1343 68.1715 -0.2186 67.9113 66.4779 -0.2697 0.0511
10% 54.4100 54.3821 -0.5827 53.4854 51.2352 -0.6449 0.0622
15% 72.9946 73.2216 -0.1252 69.9244 66.8318 -0.1917 0.0665
30% 110.3743 111.5039 0.3288 110.3744 105.5913 0.2332 0.0956
Quadratic Temporary Impact Implementation Shortfall
Percentage
Institutional Investors Noise Traders
RExcessAveBuy AveSell Return AveBuy AveSell Return
5% 105.2643 105.2981 0.2020 103.5146 101.8151 0.0892 0.1128
10% 41.8484 41.8096 -0.3663 41.5377 39.7226 -0.4495 0.0832
15% 148.7310 149.1622 0.3935 144.2607 137.8926 0.3239 0.0696
30% 117.4134 118.7752 0.2417 116.1921 111.3274 0.1335 0.1082
strategies. When the number of institutional investors changes, the protability of agents
moves in two opposite directions: with a higher percentage of homogeneous competitors,
the institutional investors have more advantages in betting on the market direction; on the
other hand, since the potential prot is limited in such a closed market, a higher number
of skilled investors are likely to dilute the limited excess return. We are curious about
which force will dominate when the number of institutional investors changes, and we will
conduct a series of simulations to examine this.
Table 5.7 presents the market quality indicators of both markets where agents are using
the linear or quadratic temporary impact IS strategies. Table 5.8 compares the protability
indicators of two kinds of agents.
Firstly, the optimal market depth and the Amihud illiquidity measure in Table 5.7 indi-
cate slightly dierent results in terms of market liquidity. The Amihud illiquidity measure
becomes larger as the percentage of the institutional investors grows, while the optimal
market depth indicator barely changes. Considering the Amihud illiquidity measure is
much more sensitive in measuring market liquidity, we believe that a growing number of
institutional investors will slightly decrease the market liquidity. Moreover, the volatility
of market price and daily return data remains at a low level, without displaying an ob-
vious pattern. It is rigorous to conclude that, the market will always benet from the IS
strategies in terms of market volatility, with the population of institutional investors no
more than 30%.
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Secondly, Table 5.8 shows that, no matter what the population of the institutional
investors is, and which direction the market price goes, those institutional investors will
always earn higher excess returns then the noise traders. Moreover, a relatively higher
excess return can be observed in both cases when the proportion of institutional investors
reaches 30%. This indicates that, when the number of homogeneous investor is large
enough, the benet of information sharing will over-whelm the prot-diluting eect.
5.6.2 Private Information
Apart from the composition of investors, the eect of private information on market quality
and institutional investors' protability are also of great interests. Market information can
be divided into public information and private information. Public information is available
to every participant in the market, although sometimes investors will not react rationally.
Private information is the resource available only to a small number of investors. According
to the DHS model in [48], investors who possess private information will always act over-
condently and sometimes irrationally. The DHS model indicates that, investors may
possess private information through various channels and they are most likely to be over-
condent about their information. If the information turns out to be true and the market
reacts rationally, they are able to make a satisfying prot and act even more condently
in the future.
In the structure of our articial stock market, we set private information as a variable.
At the beginning of every simulation period, small portions of investors would form sub-
groups with small probability Pc and share their private information, some of which might
be material but some merely rumours. They will act overcondently according to their in-
formation, betting most of their fortune on it. We are interested in how the market quality
and institutional investors' protability reacts in response to the change of the amount of
private information available in the market. In the previous sections, we performed our
simulations with Pc = 0.5%. In this section, we will conduct a further test with Pc varying
from 0.05% to 1%.
Similarly, Table 5.9 lists the market statistics for both cases. No clear trend can be
observed when the private information parameter is changed. The market quality and
volatility indicators are both stable, thus we are able to conclude that the market liquidity
and volatility are not sensitive to the private information parameter. As for the investors'
performance indicators, there is no clear trend to be seen either. The only thing that needs
to be mentioned is that, in both cases, the excess return of the institutional investors drops
rapidly when the private information parameter is set at Pc = 1%. This is an interesting
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Linear IS Quadratic IS
OMD ILQ StdPrice StdRet OMD ILQ StdPrice StdReturn
0.05% 34.0140 6.5651e-04 11.4723 0.0093 34.5120 3.5324e-04 16.5700 0.0085
0.1% 33.9945 6.0564e-04 14.2208 0.0093 33.4780 4.1415e-04 12.9438 0.0090
0.5% 33.2556 5.4262e-04 17.7575 0.0078 34.0563 3.9559e-04 15.2661 0.0074
1% 34.6165 6.2698e-04 15.9663 0.0072 33.3435 4.3024e-04 17.0546 0.0084
Table 5.9: Market Quality Indicators
Linear Temporary Impact Implementation Shortfall
Institutional Investors Noise Traders
RexcessAveBuy AveSell Return AveBuy AveSell Return
0.05% 102.9471 102.9886 1.0213 102.5951 97.8924 0.9246 0.0967
0.1% 78.9216 78.9653 0.7857 78.0414 74.4056 0.6808 0.1049
0.5% 54.4100 54.3821 -0.5827 53.4854 51.2352 -0.6449 0.0622
1% 98.1567 98.1946 1.0764 97.8375 94.0425 1.0554 0.0210
Quadratic Temporary Impact Implementation Shortfall
Percentage
Institutional Investors Noise Traders
RexcessAveBuy AveSell Return AveBuy AveSell Return
0.05% 96.7649 100.0015 1.1241 99.9778 92.7263 1.0855 0.0586
0.1% 128.7462 133.2054 1.1075 133.1451 123.0873 1.0814 0.0762
0.5% 41.8484 41.8096 -0.3663 41.5377 39.7226 -0.4495 0.0832
1% 117.2791 117.2331 1.1507 111.9456 106.5438 1.1033 0.0273
Table 5.10: Portfolio Return
phenomenon as we expected that the excess return would remain at the same level as Pc
varies. Two possible explanations can be made: 1) with greater availability of private
information, the participants are more likely to place large orders, which will increase
the market liquidity to a high level, where institutional investors can no longer prot
from providing extra liquidity; 2) with a greater availability of private information, the
participants are more likely to share common opinions and will weaken the advantage of
the implementation shortfall strategies.
The rst explanation, while intuitively appealing, is incorrect, and can be proven to be
false by examining the illiquidity measure. The insignicant increase in market illiquidity
measure indicates that, even with a higher number of orders, the eective liquidity does
not enjoy any notable improvement. Here, we are able to conclude that, the decrease in
performance could be partially ascribed to the fact that the institutional investors have no
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priority in possessing private information in this setting. As a result, the advantage of the
implementation shortfall strategies is weakened, when the private information parameter
increases.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Further Researches
6.1 Conclusions
It is of benet to examining the nancial market in a broader perspective and to the test
of optimal trading strategies under the framework of computational nance. Instead of
simply analysing the real market data, we constructed an articial stock market in this
thesis and provided an application for the agent-based computational nance theories.
Based on the structural setting of the articial markets, we tested the minimum risk
VWAP and the IS strategies with linear temporary impact. Moreover, we replaced the
linear temporary impact function of IS strategy with a quadratic one, and the new model
turned out to be able to capture the complexity of the nancial market better despite the
fact that it has an intractable analytical solution. In this thesis, we introduced the genetic
algorithm to solve the corresponding optimization problem numerically.
The statistical analysis of our articial stock market reinforced some well-established
patterns of nancial asset returns which are reported for the US stock market, such as
fat-tail and volatility clustering eects. Agents with the minimum risk VWAP strategy
are shown to succeed by following the market and in slicing/hiding their orders. When
10% of the agents choose to use the minimum risk VWAP strategy, the market shows a
signicantly lower volatility than before. This indicates that agents with the minimum risk
VWAP strategy are able to provide extra liquidity while executing their orders. However,
these agents have no advantages over the rest of the market in terms of protability. No
notable excess return can be observed from the 20-year-long market simulation.
Moreover, IS strategies have also made their contributions to the improvement of market
volatility, although they are not as good as the minimum risk VWAP. The slightly higher
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optimal market depth indicator and signicantly lower Amihud illiquidity measure both
imply higher market liquidity. The signicantly lower standard deviation of market return
indicates an improvement on market volatility. Furthermore, the market with the quadratic
implementation shortfall strategy shows a better market liquidity than the market with
the linear strategy.
Our study on two IS strategies indicates that, both of these two strategies are able
to produce more than 7% excess return over the 20-year simulation period under most
circumstances. With the number of homogeneous investors increasing from 5 to 30, no clear
trend is observed in terms of the market quality. However, a relatively higher excess return
is captured by both strategies as the number of competitors reaches 30. This indicates
that when the number of homogeneous investors is large enough, a common opinion will
be more likely to be formed and this leads to an advantage in their trading activities.
As the private information availability increases from 0.05% to 1%, the quadratic-
impact IS strategy shows an advantage according to the market illiquidity measure. This
can be seen as evidence of improvement in market liquidity. As for the performances,
a signicantly low excess return is observed in both cases when the private information
parameter reaches 1%. This could be partially ascribed to the fact that the institutional
investors have no priority in possessing private information in this market. As a result,
the advantage of the optimal execution strategies is weakened as the private information
parameter increases.
This novel approach in the optimal execution and test on trading algorithms can be
appealing for institutional traders whose order size might be large relative to the market
trading volume.
6.2 Future Research
The main purpose of this thesis is to study the optimal execution strategies, and to illustrate
how to apply a new approach in empirical testing of trading strategies. In this thesis, we
gave a brief overview of this new research approach on optimal execution strategies. The
accuracy and eciency of this approach depend greatly on the structure of the articial
stock market and how well the market is able to mimic the real stock market.
The strongest assumption of our articial stock market is the single-asset market. A-
gents in our stock market will not face any stock selection, timing or risk management
mechanisms. Although it is still sucient for the purpose of testing our strategies, it
might turn out to be ineective in testing more complicated strategies, since our optimal
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execution strategies are mostly based on measuring and minimizing the market impact.
Therefore further research is needed to introduce more security into the market, and de-
sign better schemes for stock selection, timing and explicit risk management strategies for
agents.
The second possible improvement in the articial stock market structure lies in the
agents' learning and evolving mechanism. In fact, during the research, we tried to im-
plement the genetic algorithm into the agents' learning mechanism, but it did not work
well. By adding new learning mechanisms and social network structures, such as the ge-
netic algorithm and the neural network algorithm, the simulated articial stock market
will probably perform better in mimicking the real nancial market.
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